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Fink: New York's Public Trust Doctrine

THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
NEW YORK’S DOCTRINE AND HOW IT CAN IMPROVE
Steven M. Fink*
I.

HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

The modern public trust doctrine is over a thousand of years in
the making and can be traced back to the Roman Institutes of
Justinian.1 The doctrine initially intended to preserve citizens’ access
and use of the air, running water, sea and the seashore—all were
considered to be too valuable to the public to be held as private
property.2 Book II, Title I of the Institutes of Justinian emphasized the
public’s need to use these waterways for commerce and transporting
cargo.3 Moreover, the Institutes accentuated the importance of
preserving the seashore for the public to allow commuters to stop along
their voyage and fasten cables to trees as a resting place for their
cargo.4 This general theory was recognized in England and prohibited
the King from alienating certain lands that were generally used for
egress and ingress for fishing, trading and other uses by his subjects.5
Only Parliament could enlarge or diminish these public rights.6

* Juris Doctor Candidate, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, December 2019;
B.B.A. Hofstra University, 2016. I would like to thank the entire Law Review board for their
assistance with editing this Note, including the Editor-in-Chief, Michael Morales, who
dedicated much time and effort during the publication stage. I would also like to especially
thank Professor Seplowitz for her unparalleled help and support during this entire process.
This Note is dedicated to the memory of Judge Leon Lazer; he was a true gentleman, and the
inspiration for this article. (July 4, 1921 - January 17, 2018).
1 Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some of the Traditional
Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 429 (1989).
2 JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES, Book II ¶¶ 1, 5 (J.B. Motle trans. 1911), at 19,
http://amesfoundation.law.harvard.edu/digital/CJCiv/JInst.pdf.
3 Id. ¶ 4
4 Id.
5 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in National Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 478 (1970).
6 Id.
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The public trust doctrine was first recognized as United States’
common law in the 1892 landmark United States Supreme Court
decision in Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois.7 In that case, the Court
invalidated an Illinois law that granted the Illinois Central Railroad
Company title to submerged lands in the Chicago Harbor.8 More
recently, federal courts have begun demonstrating reluctance to further
develop the doctrine,9 leaving its application to the states. In the wake
of the handful of cases that adjudicated the federal common law
doctrine, we are left with a federal doctrine that protects navigable-infact waters and the surrounding beds up to the high-water mark,
holding them in trust for the public’s use for navigation, fishing or
commerce.10
Although the federal government began developing a federal
doctrine in the late 1800s, this area is not preempted—each state has
the power to adopt and develop its own public trust doctrine,11
ultimately causing substantial differences in its application among the
states. This is further exacerbated by the limited federal precedent on
this topic. For example, the courts and legislature in Montana have
applied the doctrine to protect any surface of water that can be used for
recreational purposes.12 Other states have extended the doctrine
beyond just commerce, navigation, and fishing to include open space,
wildlife habitats, areas used for scientific purposes, hunting, bathing,

7

Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
Id. at 433-34.
9 Cathy J. Lewis, The Timid Approach of the Federal Courts to the Public Trust Doctrine:
Justified Reluctance or Dereliction of Duty?, 19 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 51, 53
(1998); Dist. of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“declin[ing]
to consider . . . whether the public trust doctrine provides a basis for Air Florida’s liability.”);
Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp 443, 449 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that Congress’s
implementation of 16 U.S.C. § 1 eliminated trust duties as they relate to “National Park System
management”).
10 See generally Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 387; United States v. Montello, 87 U.S. 430
(1874). See infra note 71 and accompanying text for a definition of navigable-in-fact waters.
11 See, e.g., Robin K. Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines:
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV.
1, 87-88 (2007); Robin K. Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust
Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public
Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 56 (2010).
12 Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984) (holding that,
“under the public trust doctrine and the 1972 Montana Constitution, any surface waters that
are capable of recreational use may be so used by the public without regard to streambed
ownership or navigability for nonrecreational purposes”).
8
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and swimming.13 Some states have even broadened the doctrine to
protect wildlife,14 parks15 and the dry sand area of beaches.16 However,
just because these spaces are protected by the doctrine does not mean
the government is properly exercising its fiduciary duty to keep them
open to the public—this is an issue that many face in Nassau County,
New York.17
Another difference in the doctrines can be spotted when
comparing the original thirteen states to those admitted later because
the former relied substantially on English common law18 while the
latter relied substantially on the Equal Footing Doctrine.19 The Equal
Footing Doctrine was created in an attempt to give those later admitted
states the same rights as the original thirteen;20 however, the original
thirteen were much less likely to be subject to federal conveyances and
reservations than the later admitted states21 because many of them were
originally federal territories.22 This resulted in, for example, several
Indian tribes owning lands under the Arkansas River in Oklahoma,23
13 See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (holding that the public trust
doctrine also includes the “right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating and general
recreational purposes the navigable waters of the state, and to use the bottom of the navigable
waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes” and that the doctrine must also preserve
lands to be used for “scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food
and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the
area”); Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (Wash. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996
(1988) (holding that the public trust doctrine does not only include navigation and fishing, but
also extends to “boating, swimming, water skiing, and other related recreational purposes”);
Menzer v. Vill. of Elkhart Lake, 186 N.W.2d 290, 296 (Wis. 1971) (holding that the Wisconsin
doctrine also preserves “all public uses of water”).
14 Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
15 Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966); Sierra Club v.
Dep’t of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
16 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
17 Paul LaRocco, Taxpayers Bought This Land. But Much of it is Hidden, NEWSDAY (July
19, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://projects.newsday.com/investigations/nassau-hidden-preservesopen-spaces/#cobrand-include. Nassau County owns hundreds of acres of land which is
supposed to be open for public use; however, it is inaccessible, fenced off or overgrown in
shrubs. Id.
18 Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines, supra note
11, at 56.
19 Weber v. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, 85 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1873).
20 Id.
21 Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines, supra note
11, at 66.
22 Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines, supra note
11, at 66.
23 Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-32 (1970); United States v. Cherokee
Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 701 (1987).
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and the United States retaining title to the Coeur d’Alene Lake and
Idaho’s St. Joe River in trust for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.24
While each state has its own doctrine that may be very
extensive and vary greatly from its neighbors, this Note will focus on
New York’s public trust doctrine and will briefly discuss features that
belong to doctrines of several other states. Section II will provide a
brief introduction to the doctrine and how it is generally applied.
Section III will explore the federal public trust doctrine, and section IV
will indicate the issues that may arise as a result of the federal
government’s approach. Section V will compare the rights reserved
for New Yorkers to access water held in trust to the rights reserved for
the citizens of other states. Section VI will analyze the ability of New
York to dispose of trust property, as well as the history of judicial
review of such alienation. Section VII will survey how certain states
address pollution and wildlife destruction suits under the public trust
doctrine and discuss why these claims should not automatically arise
under the public trust doctrine. Section VIII will explore how the
public trust doctrine could cause more harm than good, and section IX
will discuss how New York’s doctrine is not overly burdensome as
some may believe. Ultimately, this Note will conclude that New
York’s doctrine is moderately more expansive than the federal doctrine
and does not unreasonably burden the rights of real estate developers
and riparian landowners. While New York’s current doctrine is not an
effective model for other states, it could be with a few minor
adjustments to further benefit the public.
II.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

Each state has its own public trust doctrine that may vary
drastically in breadth compared to its neighbors; however, one idea
that remains the same across the country is that the doctrine’s main
purpose is to protect certain property so people may use and enjoy it.
Professor Alexandra Klass of the University of Minnesota Law School
described the public trust doctrine as embodying the idea that certain
resources, such as tidal and navigable waters and land underneath
them, are owned by the state with a permanent restriction against
alienation.25 Professor Klass further explained that “[t]o some, the
24

Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 272 (2001).
Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating
Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699 (2006).
25
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doctrine is a vehicle for public access to water, beaches, or fishing in a
world otherwise dominated by private ownership.”26 This theory was
reflected in the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision that granted the
public the right to cross over the dry sand area of a beach that was
owned by a private entity.27 Others believe that the doctrine is a “check
on government attempts to give away or sell [certain] . . . resources for
short-term economic gain.”28 This argument is noted in a 1989
Vermont Supreme Court decision, which prohibited the sale of 1.1
miles of land along the City of Burlington’s waterfront because that
land was subject to the public trust doctrine and, therefore, could not
be sold.29 Last, the doctrine may be used as “a back-door mechanism
for judicial taking of private property without just compensation
through a clever argument that the property was never ‘private’ in the
first place,”30 and, thus, was never privately owned. Although the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution protects the people from the government’s taking one’s
property for public use without just compensation, the public trust
doctrine is an exception.31 For example, when an event, such as rising
sea levels, causes the private property owner’s land to be increasingly
submerged, it is effectively taken by the government to be held in
trust.32 This is because states only allow private ownership of lands up
to a certain point, usually determined by a mean water mark.33 When
the water levels rise, so do the water marks, ultimately causing the
landowner’s property ownership to diminish.34 While the government
may not have actively attempted to take the newly submerged land, the
26

Id. at 699.
Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 113 (N.J. 2005)
(holding that the beach association is not permitted to limit the public’s access to the water,
nor the use of the upland sand for intermittent recreational purposes that are connected to the
use of the ocean).
28 Klass, supra note 25, at 699.
29 State v. Cent. Vt. Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d 1128, 1129 (Vt. 1989).
30 Klass, supra note 25, at 699.
31 McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2003) (holding that rising
water levels create new and additional tidelands which then constitute res in a public trust;
accordingly, private ownership is diminished in the new tidelands for the benefit of the public).
32 Id.
33 Sax, supra note 5, at 476.
34 Conversely, New Jersey has held that when the dry land area is increased in size as a
result of a beach replenishment program, the riparian landowner is not afforded any ownership
interest in such property. City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d 542, 560 (N.J. 2010).
Accordingly, a riparian landowner’s property ownership is subject to reduction, without the
possibility of it increasing. Id.
27
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public trust doctrine may cause a passive acquisition of the land by the
government35 without the need to commence a condemnation
proceeding pursuant to the Takings Clause which states: “nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”36
Ultimately, the government may take land from a private landowner
and not pay any compensation if the taking is performed pursuant to
the public trust doctrine.
Similar to Professor Klass’s idea that the public trust doctrine
acts as a check on the government from alienating certain resources,
late Professor Joseph Sax, a highly renowned public trust doctrine
scholar and author of The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,37 noted that the public trust
doctrine imposed three major restrictions on the government.38 First,
when property is subject to a trust, it must not only be used for a public
purpose, but also be readily available to the general public.39
Therefore, the resource must be open and accessible to the public and
any significant restriction on its use would likely be considered an
unlawful breach of the government’s duty pursuant to the doctrine.40
Second, “the property may not be sold, even for a fair cash
equivalent”41 or for a worthy cause without legislative approval. For
instance, the New York Court of Appeals decided in 1873 that, without
legislative approval, protected land could not be used even for a worthy
cause such as a courthouse or school.42 Last, “the property must be
maintained for particular types of uses.”43 To further explain this last
point, Professor Sax indicated that the property or “resource must be
35

Not only is trust res protected against alienation by the doctrine, once a municipality takes
title to property to be held in its governmental capacity, it cannot be acquired by another even
through adverse possession. N.Y.C. v. Sarnelli Bros., Inc., 720 N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (App. Div.
2001).
36 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
37 Sax, supra note 5.
38 Sax, supra note 5, at 477.
39 Sax, supra note 5, at 477.
40 See, e.g., Lake George S.B. Co. v. Blais, 281 N.E.2d 147, 148 (N.Y. 1972) (holding that
“[i]t has long been the rule that a municipality, without specific legislative sanction, may not
permit property acquired or held by it for public use to be wholly or partly diverted to a
possession or use exclusively private.”). See also State v. Vogt, 775 A.2d 551, 561 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (holding that while the resource must be open to the public, the
government may impose reasonable restrictions on use of the resource such as enacting
legislation that criminalizes being nude on a beach).
41 Sax, supra note 5, at 477.
42 Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121, 122 (N.Y. 1920).
43 Sax, supra note 5, at 477.
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held available for certain traditional uses, such as navigation,
recreation, or fishery . . . [or] must be in some sense related to the
natural uses peculiar to that resource.”44
These restrictions on alienation have protected property for
more uses than were initially intended by the Institutes of Justinian,
such as the New Jersey Supreme Court’s declaration that the doctrine
must not adhere to “ancient prerogatives of navigation and fishing, but
[must] extend as well to recreational uses, including bathing,
swimming and other shore activities.”45 The New Jersey court further
held that the doctrine should not be “fixed or static, but should be
molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the
public it was created to benefit.”46 For example, Mississippi has
expanded its doctrine to protect commerce, bathing, swimming and
other recreational activities, development of mineral resources,
environmental protection and preservation, the enhancement of
aquatic, avian and marine life, sea agriculture and more.47 However,
not all states share this view. For instance, two scholars addressed the
absence of an effective Nevada doctrine, writing that Nevada simply
lacks “sufficient public trust statutes to have effected any state-law
expansions of the doctrine.”48 Another scholar went as far to write,
“Nevada remains the only western state that has not addressed the
public trust doctrine.”49 These claims became outdated recently when
the Nevada Supreme Court acknowledged the state’s narrow doctrine
in a 2011 decision.50
Regardless of whether a state has a broad doctrine or one that
was very modestly developed, a plaintiff or petitioner asserting a claim
arising under the public trust doctrine must have standing to sue,
otherwise the case will be dismissed.51 In an effort to clarify an earlier
decision,52 in 1992 the United States Supreme Court created a three-

44

Sax, supra note 5, at 477.
Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972).
46 Id.
47 Cinque Bambini P’ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 512 (Miss. 1986).
48 Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines, supra note
11, at 70.
49
John P. Sande, IV, A River Runs to It: Can the Public Trust Doctrine Save Walker Lake?,
44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 831, 833 n.15 (2004).
50 Lawrence v. Clark Cty., 254 P.3d 606, 606-12 (Nev. 2011) (holding that the public trust
doctrine “requires the state to serve as trustee for public resources”).
51 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
52 See generally id.
45

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 4 [2018], Art. 16

1208

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

prong test to determine standing.53 The initial burden of proof is on
the plaintiff, who must prove satisfaction of each element to pursue a
public trust doctrine claim.54 First, the plaintiff must prove that he
suffered an “injury in fact”; the claimed damages are not conjectural
or hypothetical.55 Next, the plaintiff must prove that there is a nexus
between the injury and the defendant’s conduct he is seeking to
enjoin.56 This second element requires proof that the injury was not
actually the result of an independent third party.57 Last, the plaintiff
must prove that a favorable court order is likely—not merely
speculative—to remedy the claimed injury.58
III.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

Originally, the public trust doctrine only limited private
ownership of lands beneath tidal waters.59 The first federal expansion
of the doctrine can be traced back to an 1842 United States Supreme
Court decision which held that the people also have the right to access
and use navigable waters as well as the soil under them.60 These areas
are also protected and cannot be alienated.61 Just a few years later, the
Court recognized the Equal Footing Doctrine, which granted newly
admitted states ownership of all tidal and navigable water within their
borders, along with the soil beneath the water, to be held in trust for
the benefit of the people.62 However, in utilizing the Equal Footing
Doctrine, the United States retained ownership to any waters and lands
beneath them that were not then navigable or tidal.63 Accordingly, the
states were only granted title to navigable-in-fact waters and the lands
53

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that plaintiffs, several
wildlife organizations, lacked standing as they did not suffer a harm or injury that was not also
suffered by all of the citizens).
54 See generally id.
55 Id. at 560-61.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. See infra note 155 and accompanying text for a discussion of
standing.
59 Richard Ausness, Water Rights, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of Instream
Uses, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 407, 408 (1986).
60
Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 432-33 (1842).
61 Id. (holding that after the revolution, the states received the king’s responsibility of
holding certain property in trust, and therefore, any alienation of previously protected property
would be a breach of the public trust doctrine).
62 Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 228-29 (1845).
63 PPL Montana, L.L.C. v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 591 (2012).
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beneath them when they were navigable-in-fact at the time of
statehood.64 Moreover, such analysis is to be performed on a segmentby-segment basis,65 which has resulted in state ownership of portions
of riverbeds and United States ownership of other portions of the same
riverbeds.66
The next major development in the federal public trust doctrine
was the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Illinois Central
R.R. v. Illinois.67 In that case, the Illinois legislature conveyed over
1,000 acres of submerged lands beneath Lake Michigan to the Illinois
Central Railroad Company.68 Ultimately, the Court invalidated the
transfer and held that the conveyance directly conflicted with the
public trust doctrine which protected the submerged lands and
therefore substantially restricted the public’s ability to use the area for
navigation, commerce and fishing.69 Navigable waters may only be
alienated when doing so improves the public’s interest or would not
impose a detriment to the public’s interest “in the lands and waters
remaining.”70
Under federal law, a body of water is navigable-in-fact when:
(1) “[v]essels of any kind . . . can float upon the water;” (2) “are, or
may become, the mode by which a vast commerce can be conducted .
. . in order to give it the character of a navigable stream;” or (3) is
“generally and commonly useful to some purpose of trade or
agriculture.”71 Nevertheless, if the water is not navigable-in-fact, but
is tidal, it is still protected under the public trust doctrine.72 As a result
of Illinois Central R.R., the federal public trust doctrine also preserves
the people’s right to use navigable waters for navigation, commerce
and fishing. This is an expansion of the traditional navigable-in-law
concept that merely protects any “[w]aterways that are affected by

64

United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931).
PPL Montana, 565 U.S. at 593.
66 United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 79.
67 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
68 Id. at 433-34.
69
See generally id.
70 Id. at 452.
71 United States v. Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1874).
72 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476-81 (1988) (affirming precedent
that indicates state ownership of all tidal water—bodies of water that are affected by the “ebb
and flow of the tide”).
65
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tides,”73 and therefore, waters can receive public trust protection even
if they are not affected by the tide.
IV.

INADEQUACY OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

While the federal doctrine provides the states with a good
foundation to expand upon, it is currently inadequate because it is
based largely on ancient prerogatives and only modestly accounts for
changing times.74 Unlike most states that have legislation and case law
to further their doctrines, the Arizona legislature has made several
attempts to limit the public trust doctrine, thus, often defaulting to
federal law. Although Arizona enacted many laws in 1995 that
appeared to extend its doctrine in regard to water rights,75 the
legislature expressly stated that it “does not intend to create an
implication that the public trust doctrine applies to water rights in this
state.”76 Moreover, the state legislature even attempted to alienate the
state’s ownership of all watercourses within the state, except for a few
rivers, by quitclaim deed, and also to permit the issuance of a quitclaim
deed for lands in or near the beds of the Gila, Salt and Verde Rivers
for a small fee of only twenty-five dollars.77 In a 1991 decision, the
Arizona Court of Appeals held that these legislative attempts to destroy
a significant part of the state’s public trust doctrine were deemed an
unlawful breach of the doctrine and the state’s constitution.78
Subsequently, Governor Hull signed Senate Bill 1126 into law on May
4, 1998, which again restricted the public trust doctrine.79 This
legislation80 officially created a new navigability test that was more
lenient than the federal approach and permitted an increased amount
of alienation of areas that were otherwise inalienable pursuant to
federal law.81 In February of 2001, the Arizona Court of Appeals
determined that the statute was unconstitutional and a violation of the
73 Steven C. Russo, OGC 9: Enforcement Guidance: Public Rights of Navigation and
Fishing, N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION (Dec. 7, 2011), https://www.dec.ny.gov/
regulations/74771.html.
74 See supra Section III.
75 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-101-343 (LexisNexis 2018).
76
1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 9, § 25(B), p.36.
77 Ariz. Ctr. for Law in Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 162 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
78 Id. at 174.
79 Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 727 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
80 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 37-1129 (LexisNexis 1998).
81 Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 727.
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public trust.82 While the state legislature made these repeated attempts
to dismantle its public trust doctrine, the judicial branch worked to
remedy this problem, announcing in an Arizona Supreme Court
decision that the “public trust doctrine is a constitutional limitation on
legislative power to give away resources held by the state in trust for
its people.”83 Furthermore, the court indicated that it is “for the courts
to decide whether the public trust doctrine is applicable to the facts.”84
Similar to Arizona, Colorado has done very little to expand its
doctrine. For example, in 1976, in People v. Emmert,85 three
individuals were floating on rafts on the Colorado River.86 Eventually,
the river passed through a privately owned ranch that the individuals
did not have permission to enter.87 The three individuals did not leave
their rafts at any time, nor did they encroach upon the shoreline,88 but,
nevertheless, they were arrested and eventually charged with thirddegree criminal trespass.89 The defendants were found guilty because
they stipulated that they floated on a section of the river that could be
privately owned because it was non-navigable and “not historically
used for commercial or trade purposes of any kind.”90 Similarly, New
York protects its riparian landowners as it only expanded its doctrine
to protect waterways that “have practical usefulness to the public as a
highway for transportation,”91 which would have similarly resulted in
criminal convictions for the defendants. However, a broader
application of the doctrine, as demonstrated in New Hampshire,
protects any “river or stream [that] is capable in its natural state of
some useful service to the public because of its existence.”92 Arguably,
the very same defendants in Emmert would not have faced trespass
charges had they been in New Hampshire because the river served, in
its natural state, usefulness for recreational transportation, which could
be considered a useful service.

82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id. at 739.
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999).
Id.
597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979).
Id. at 1026.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1030.
Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1026.
N.Y. NAV. LAW § 2(5) (McKinney 2018).
St. Regis Paper Co. v. N.H. Water Res. Bd., 26 A.2d 832, 838 (N.H. 1942).
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While no state should be required to expand its doctrine to
protect all rivers and streams for use by the public for any beneficial
purpose, states should make meaningful expansions to ensure the
public can fully enjoy their natural amenities. When a state refuses to
make any important expansions of its public trust doctrine, it must rely
substantially on the federal doctrine. Not only does this criminalize an
act as innocuous as floating down a river that is non-navigable, it can
also completely bar access to water that is navigable. To date, the
federal doctrine has not expanded to provide the public with any right
to cross any dry sand areas to reach a navigable waterway.
Accordingly, the federal doctrine could permit private ownership of
land surrounding a body of navigable water and deny the public any
rights to cross over any of the riparian owners’ property. This
effectively precludes the public from accessing the body of water that
it otherwise has a right to access. An effective remedy to this issue
would be to follow New Jersey’s Matthews factors.93
V.

RIGHT TO ACCESS WATER HELD IN TRUST

One of the many differences that exist among the states’
doctrines is the right to access water held in trust. For example, some
states criminalize crossing over the dry sand area of a private
landowner to access trust waters or foreshores94 while other states
encourage it.95
A.

New York

Although New York is home to a substantial number of
beautiful beaches and waterfront homes, there has been limited
litigation regarding the application of the public trust doctrine to beach
access. Accordingly, the boundary between the private landowner’s
rights and the public’s rights is unclear.96 Nevertheless, the extremely
modest case law in this area suggests that the private property owner
has the sole right to all real estate that is landward of the high water

93

See discussion of the Matthews factors infra Section V.F.
Cavanaugh v. Town of Narragansett, No. WC91-0496, 1997 R.I. Super. LEXIS 21, at
*28 (Oct. 10, 1997).
95 See generally Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
96 Robin K. Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines, supra note
11, at 87-88.
94
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mark, none of which the public may lawfully use, while the public only
has the right to access the lands seaward of the mean high water mark.97
This approach could result in criminal charges against individuals who
cross privately owned dry sand beaches to reach the foreshore.98
Accordingly, New York prefers the rights of riparian landowners over
those of the public, thus permitting the landowner to enjoy his real
estate without the burden of beachgoers.
B.

Washington

Washington’s doctrine provides the public with arguably the
least water access as its appellate court refused to give the public any
right to cross over any privately owned property and only affords its
citizens the right to use the foreshore when it is covered by water.99
When the tide is out, the people in Washington do not have any right
to use the foreshore.100 Accordingly, the court has not only barred the
people from crossing over a private owner’s land to reach the water
under any circumstance, but it has also limited the time during which
the public may use the foreshore.
C.

Rhode Island

Rhode Island’s doctrine indicates that the government holds the
foreshore below the mean high tide line in trust for the public to use;
however, the public has no right to access dry sand areas above that
line.101 This rule developed after James Cavanaugh, who failed to pay
the beach admission fee, attempted to cross the dry sand area of a
Rhode Island beach to reach the shoreline.102 The Town of
Narragansett responded with criminal charges for failing to pay the

97 Arnold’s Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541, 547 (Sup. Ct. 1970). High Water Mark,
DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/high-water-mark?s=t (last visited Oct.
3, 2018) (defining high water mark as “the highest level reached by a body of water” during
high tide).
98 This approach is similar to Rhode Island’s doctrine in that crossing over privately owned
dry sand beach to reach the foreshore could result in criminal charges. Cavanaugh, 1997 R.I.
Super. LEXIS, at *28.
99 City of Bainbridge Island v. Brennan, No. 31816-4-II, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 1744, at
*4 (July 20, 2005).
100 Id.
101 Cavanaugh, 1997 R.I. Super. LEXIS, at *28.
102 Id. at *5.
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beach admission fee.103 The court held that the public has no right to
cross the dry sand area to reach the foreshore104 and ultimately found
Cavanaugh guilty of a misdemeanor.105 This decision illustrates that if
a body of water is entirely surrounded by privately owned property,
the public has no right to cross it to reach the water, rendering it
accessible only by the landowners.
D.

Massachusetts

In a 1979 decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that
a private landowner owns all real estate landward of the mean low tide
mark; however, the public retains an easement over the foreshore for
the sole purposes of navigation, fishing and fowling.106 Almost twenty
years later, the Appellate Court further indicated that the public has
“no right to cross, without permission, the dry land of another for the
purpose of gaining access to the water or the flats in order to exercise
public trust rights; doing so constitutes a trespass.”107 Accordingly,
Massachusetts appears to take a very pro-landowner position because
it extends private ownership down to the mean low tide mark—an
extension made by only a few states—and permits public access to the
foreshore for only very limited activities.108 While this approach limits
the public’s use of certain bodies of water, especially those completely
surrounded by private land ownership, it respects the rights of the
landowners and effectively prevents an unwanted easement across
their land.
E.

Maryland

Maryland similarly has a pro-landowner position.
In
109
Department of Natural Resources v. Mayor of Ocean City, a real
estate developer sought to construct a condominium on the dry sand
area of an oceanfront lot.110 In an effort to halt the development, the
103

Id.
Id. at *28.
105 Id. at *5.
106
Bos. Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 365 (Mass. 1979).
107 Sheftel v. Lebel, 689 N.E.2d 500, 505 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
108 See infra notes 240-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the public’s right to
access property in relation to a watermark.
109 332 A.2d 630 (Md. 1975).
110 Id. at 632.
104
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public filed suit claiming that the construction would prevent its access
to the dry sand area, constituting a breach of the public trust doctrine.111
The court quickly decided that the public trust doctrine only protects
the foreshore, not any of the dry land above it.112 More recently, this
was upheld in Clickner v. Magothy River Association Inc.,113 in which
the court limited the doctrine to protect only the sand up to the mean
high tide line.114 Accordingly, the “public has no right to access or
cross privately owned upland sand areas in order to reach the public
foreshore.”115
F.

New Jersey

New Jersey has the broadest public trust doctrine in terms of
providing the public with access to the foreshore because, in certain
circumstances, it permits the public to cross over the dry sand area in
order to reach the foreshore—even when the sand is privately
owned.116 In 1984, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the dry
sand area above the mean high water line may be subject to the public
trust doctrine, thereby protecting it for the enjoyment by the people.117
The court reasoned that, in order for the public to fully enjoy the rights
preserved by the doctrine, it must also preserve a limited right in the
dry areas just above the water line.118 However, the court indicated
that the public’s right to the dry sand area was not absolute, but it
created four factors to determine whether the public has access rights
and, if so, the extent of those rights. Known as the Matthews factors,
they are used to determine whether property is subject to the doctrine.
First, the court examines the dry sand area in relation to the
foreshore.119 Second, it considers the magnitude and availability of
publicly owned upland sand area.120 Third, it contemplates the nature
111

Id.
Id. at 634.
113 35 A.3d 464 (Md. 2012).
114 Id. at 473.
115 Jack Potash, The Public Trust Doctrine and Beach Access: Comparing New Jersey to
Nearby States, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 661, 662 (2016).
116 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984) (holding that the
association was a quasi-public entity, thus the public has a right to cross the dry sand area that
it owns).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 365.
119 Id.
120 Id.
112
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and extent of the public demand for access to the foreshore and use of
the beach.121 Last, it studies the usage of the upland sand by the
owner.122 The court reasoned that in certain circumstances, giving the
public the right to use a portion of the dry sand area near the water
provided for meaningful use of that water.123 Without granting this
right, a body of water could ultimately be inaccessible to the public
except for owners of land abutting the mean high water mark or those
who have been granted permission to cross the land. Moreover, this
also prevents the public from being arrested for trespass.
In Raleigh Avenue Beach Association v. Atlantis Beach Club,
Inc., the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the Matthews factors in a
groundbreaking 2005 decision that rendered privately owned sand
area—above the mean high water line—open to the public.124 Atlantis
Beach Club, Inc. owned and operated a beach club in New Jersey,
charged its members access fees to use the beach and restricted all
nonmembers from gaining entry.125 The court held that this practice
violated the public trust doctrine by restricting the public’s right to
access the water.126 It further explained that
Atlantis cannot limit [the public’s] vertical [crossing
the dry sand area] or horizontal [use along the
shoreline] . . . access to its dry sand beach area nor
interfere with the public’s right to free use of the dry
sand for intermittent recreational purposes connected
with the ocean and wet sand.127
It applied the Matthews factors to a private association which expanded
the scope of the doctrine. However, the court in Matthews envisioned
such expansion.128
New Jersey’s four-factor test is arguably the best approach to
address beach access. A strict approach that refuses the public any
right to cross the dry land area of a private landowner substantially
impacts the public’s right to use a body of water. Such an approach
does not further the public’s interests because, in many instances, it
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365.
Id.
Id. at 364.
Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 113 (N.J. 2005).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Matthews, 471 A.2d at 366.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss4/16

16

Fink: New York's Public Trust Doctrine

2018

NEW YORK’S PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

1217

restricts people from using and enjoying public trust areas. However,
the public should still be respectful of the private owner’s interests and
privacy concerns. Using this four-factor test, the courts effectively
consider both the public’s interests and the private landowners’
interests in reaching a decision that does not result in a complete
prohibition to access a body of water and also does not subject each
landowner to an unwanted easement.129 The Matthews factors, taken
together, limit the public’s use when it would be overly burdensome to
the landowner, while permitting access when doing so would be
reasonable. Although New York has not had a case that is directly on
point, it should adopt this approach in an appropriate case.
VI.

PERMISSION TO ALIENATE AND RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

The New York State Legislature retains the sole power and
discretion to alienate, or otherwise change, the use of protected areas.
There is but one instance in which legislative approval is not necessary
for alienation and that is when a grant is pursuant to an urban renewal
plan,130 which will be discussed in detail in section IX of this Note.
The litigation in New York that has arisen under the public trust
doctrine focused on whether the area in question was subject to the
doctrine131 or whether a municipality had a duty to preserve an area,132
keep it open to the public133 and retain title to it.134 None of the case
law apparently involves review of a legislative grant. This may
indicate that the legislature is given complete deference in its decisions
with regard to the public trust doctrine.
Somewhat similar to New York, Illinois follows a title theory
whereby the state’s title to the resources is impressed by a trust in favor
of a particular use.135 Under this theory, legislative approval must be
secured before any alienation.136 The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that
129 Id. at 369 (holding that if a body of water is inaccessible due to private riparian land
ownership, some of the privately owned land could be subject to unwanted easements).
130 Vill. Green Realty Corp. v. Glen Cove Cmty. Dev. Agency, 466 N.Y.S.2d 26 (App. Div.
1983).
131 See In re Glick v. Harvey, 36 N.E.3d 640 (N.Y. 2015).
132
Evans v. Johnstown, 410 N.Y.S.2d 199, 207 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
133 10 E. Realty, LLC v. Inc. Vill. of Val. Stream, 793 N.Y.S.2d 122 (App. Div. 2005).
134 Vill. Green Realty Corp., 466 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
135 Thomas W. Merrill, The Public Trust Doctrine: Some Jurisprudential Variations and
Their Implications, 38 HAW. L. REV. 261 (2016).
136 People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773, 780 (Ill. 1976).
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legislative approval must withstand the most critical examination if the
alienation is in favor of a private entity.137 Similarly, Washington
courts use a heightened degree of scrutiny when reviewing any
legislation relating to the public trust doctrine.138 However, these
theories should be avoided. In a case arising under the public trust
doctrine, the court is not considering a suspect class, a fundamental
right, or other highly sensitive and important subjects that would
warrant a form of strict or heightened scrutiny, and therefore, is simply
unnecessary. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has ruled
that weighing the advantages and disadvantages of certain issues is the
role of the legislative branch, not the judicial branch, because it is
sufficiently capable of determining what is in the best interest of the
public due to the country’s democratic process.139 Since the legislature
is elected directly by the people, limiting its ability to alienate
protected areas reduces the public’s voice on how those areas should
be utilized.
Another interesting approach is found within Alaska’s
Constitution, providing that “[w]herever occurring in their natural
state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common
use.”140 Alaska’s Supreme Court has interpreted this to simply create
a trust for the people, not a public trust.141 Alaskan courts define the
result of Article VIII of its Constitution as a trust-like relationship in
which Alaska is to hold fish, wildlife, water and other natural resources
in trust for the benefit of its citizens.142 Therefore, “instead of
recognizing the creation of a public trust in the clause per se, we have
noted that the common use clause was intended to engraft in [its]
constitution certain trust principles guaranteeing access to the fish,
wildlife and water resources of the state.”143 Thus, Alaska’s public
trust doctrine is not actually that broad since it appears to address
protection of natural resources via an alternative route that mirrors a
137

Id.
Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 103 P.3d 203, 205 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (holding
that a “statute enacted through the initiative process is presumed constitutional and the party
challenging it bears the burden of proving it unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nonetheless, courts review legislation under the public trust doctrine with a heightened degree
of judicial scrutiny, as if measuring the legislation against constitutional protections” (citations
omitted)).
139 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
140 ALASKA CONST. amend. VIII, § 3.
141 Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Alaska 1999).
142 Id.
143 Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).
138
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traditional doctrine. This approach is analogous to that of Hawaii’s by
requiring a constitutional amendment to alter the trust while leaving
the courts with the substantial power of interpreting the state’s
constitution.
Although similar to the Alaskan approach, Hawaii is slightly
more protective. Hawaii follows a constitutional theory where the
constitution “mandates that certain resources be devoted to particular
public uses,”144 effectively requiring a constitutional amendment to
otherwise alienate an area. Since the doctrine is almost completely
embedded in the state constitution, “ultimate authority to interpret and
defend the public trust in Hawai’i rests with the courts.”145 This
procedure should also be avoided because, not only does the legislature
have little control in alienating a protected area or changing its use, any
changes to Hawaii’s doctrine requires a constitutional amendment
either through a constitutional convention or by the legislature
proposing a constitutional amendment to the electorate.146 While
allowing the electorate to decide these issues would be ideal, this
process fails to account for the excessive amount of time it would take
to make any changes and the fact that the entire state would determine
the use of a specific area. This means that an individual, hundreds of
miles away from the subject site, who may have never visited it, would
have the same voting right as the individual who may be interested in
developing it. Accordingly, if a small community sought to develop a
few acres of protected land to build a school, courthouse, sporting
facility or otherwise, those who do not have easy access to the facilities
would likely vote it down simply to preserve protected areas without
engaging in a meaningful examination of the matter.
What may surprise many is that New York has the preferable
method of alienation and judicial review as compared to these few
states; however, it is still not perfect. It allows for the elected
legislature to make decisions on behalf of the people, leaving a
political remedy should it go astray. This is similar to the approach of
the Washington Supreme Court which held that once property is
“acquired and devoted to public use [it] is held in trust for the public
and cannot be alienated without legislative authority, either express or
144

Merrill, supra note 135, at 261.
Kauai Springs, Inc. v. Planning Comm’n of Kaua’i, 324 P.3d 951, 975 (Haw. 2014).
146 Revision and Amendment of Hawaii State Constitution, ST. HAW. OFF. ELECTIONS,
http://elections.hawaii.gov/resources/revision-and-amendment-of-the-hawaii-stateconstitution/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2018).
145
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implied.”147 However, New York courts should have more power to
decide on the merits of a proposed alienation of parkland, which is the
subject of a substantial amount of litigation in the state arising under
the doctrine. When a suit is filed that invokes public trust doctrine
protection of parkland, the New York courts first review the
classification of the area.148 When a party claims that an area has been
expressly or impliedly classified as parkland or dedicated to public use,
the courts should have appropriate authority to determine whether the
area is appropriately subject to the doctrine. However, when an area
is expressly classified as parkland, the courts seem to lack any power
of judicial review or, more likely, provide complete deference to the
municipality that classified the area.149 While it is important to give
substantial deference to the municipal agencies that handle express
classification, we must be wary of areas that may have been
misclassified or not sufficiently used by the public. The very definition
of a “park is, in its strict sense, a piece of ground inclosed [sic] for
purposes of pleasure, exercise, amusement or ornament.”150 A park
“need not and should not be a mere field or open space.”151 When an
area is impliedly or expressly classified as parkland, the court should
take a more active role in determining whether that classification is
accurate by considering whether the public uses the area, the extent to
which the public utilizes the area, and the purposes for which the public
uses the area. This will prevent misclassification of an area that should
not be labeled as a park.
Moreover, the courts should also retain discretion to review the
grant by the legislature with a rational basis type of test, whereby the
court exercises a relatively lenient review of the grant. This review
should consider whether the grant would significantly adversely
impact local residents from having access to that type of amenity (i.e.,
whether the citizens would have reasonable access to a park if the
legislature alienates one) and whether the grant would have any
detrimental impacts on the surrounding areas to constitute a partial
taking, such as significantly decreased property values, or cause a
burdensome nuisance. This type of review will allow the courts and
147

City of Bainbridge Island v. Brennan, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 1744, at *45 (July 20,
2005).
148 In re Avella v. N.Y.C., 80 N.E.3d 982, 983 (N.Y. 2017).
149 See generally id.
150 Perrin v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 36 N.Y. 120, 124 (1867).
151 Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121, 122 (N.Y. 1920).
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the legislature to share a fair separation of powers while giving the
legislature substantial deference to ensure adhering to the voice of the
people.
VII.

THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO POLLUTION
AND WILDLIFE

Global warming is a substantial and growing problem in the
twenty-first century152 and has caused an extensive list of lawsuits that
have invoked public trust doctrine protection; however, many states
refuse to allow a pollution claim pursuant to their doctrines.153 Many
of these lawsuits have resulted in unfavorable decisions for the
plaintiffs because many states refuse to acknowledge that pollution
comes within the scope of the doctrine.154 Moreover, in many
instances, it is impossible to pinpoint the polluter, which ultimately
causes standing issues.155
One state that refused to include pollution as an item that can
be controlled under the doctrine is New Mexico. The New Mexico
Court of Appeals refused to extend the public trust doctrine to include
the regulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere on the grounds
that such regulation should be addressed by the legislature, and any
claims should arise under the state’s Air Quality Control Act.156
Furthermore, the court held that any decision on the issue without
consideration of the Act would be a clear violation of the separation of
powers principles.157 Similarly, Alaska’s Supreme Court dismissed a
plaintiff’s claim that the state breached its fiduciary duty to preserve
the atmosphere, thus, causing adverse effects on the water, shorelines,
wildlife and fish, and held that the other governmental branches should
handle such regulation.158
152 Aaron M. McCright & Riley E. Dunlap, Challenging Global Warming as a Social
Problem: An Analysis of the Conservative Movement’s Counter-Claims, 47 SOC. PROBS. 499
(2000).
153 See Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015); Kanuk v. State,
335 P.3d 1088, 1103 (Alaska 2014); Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D.
Or. 2016); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Miss. 2012); Comer v.
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013).
154
See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal.
2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2390 (2013).
155 Id.
156 Sanders-Reed, 350 P.3d at 1227.
157 Id.
158 Kanuk, 335 P.3d at 1103.
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Even more recently, a group of young United States citizens
filed suit against the federal government claiming it breached its
fiduciary duty pursuant to the public trust doctrine.159 In Juliana v.
United States, the plaintiffs alleged that the federal government’s
decisions regarding regulating carbon dioxide emissions, permitting
fossil fuel extraction, giving tax breaks and directly subsidizing the
fossil fuel industry, funding natural gas pipelines, regulating the import
and export of fossil fuels, and authorizing new marine coal terminal
projects all had an adverse effect on climate change.160 The plaintiffs
argued that these items, taken together, should constitute a breach of
the fiduciary duties under the public trust doctrine.161 Although the
court refused to decide whether the atmosphere is protected under the
doctrine,162 it found that the plaintiffs’ claim that the government’s
actions have caused them to suffer the negative consequences of ocean
acidification and rising ocean temperatures—assets that are typically
protected under the doctrine—were sufficient to allow the case to
proceed. Because a number of the plaintiffs’ injuries related to the
effects of ocean acidification and rising ocean temperatures, the
plaintiffs adequately alleged harm to public trust assets.163
Similarly, Pennsylvania has a doctrine that vests the people
with a right to “clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment [that
are] . . . common property of all the people, including generations yet
to come” and that “the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain
them for the benefit of all the people.”164 The state’s Supreme Court
declared that this constitutional provision “installs the common law
public trust doctrine as a constitutional right to environmental
protection,” which is “susceptible to enforcement by an action in
equity.”165 Accordingly, it is possible that a plaintiff may be successful
in filing a pollution claim arising under the doctrine in Pennsylvania.
159

Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D. Or. 2016).
Id. at 1255.
161 Id. at 1234.
162 Id. at 1255.
163 Id. at 1256.
164 PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; see also Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 93 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1973) (relying on both the public trust doctrine and the Pennsylvania Constitution to require
maintenance of “clean air . . . and [] the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic
values of the environment”).
165 Commonwealth v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d 588, 596 (Pa. 1973)
(emphasis in original).
160
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Slightly similar to Pennsylvania’s, Alaska’s public trust
doctrine indicates that the “[s]tate holds certain resources (such as
wildlife, minerals, and water rights) in trust for public use, ‘and that
government owes a fiduciary duty to manage such resources for the
common good of the public as beneficiary.’”166 However, while
Alaska’s Supreme Court held in Baxley v. State167 that the state owes
the public a fiduciary duty in managing the resources, the court held in
Brady v. State168—just five months later—that the state need not be
proactive in protecting trust property.169 In the latter case, the court
found that the state was not liable for waste when beetles were severely
destroying forests, which placed a significant limit on the state’s
fiduciary duty in managing the trust res.170 Thus, the court apparently
indicated that the government could allow passive degradation while
imposing a duty to protect against active damage. Even utilizing this
theory would be beneficial to New York since it has not yet developed
an approach to polluted water.171
While the New York doctrine goes to great lengths to protect
parks, it seems to take a backseat when considering pollution.172 For
example, a New York court ruled that, although sewage was
intentionally being dumped into the Cayadutta Creek, the state did not
have a duty to prevent such acts.173 The court reasoned that even if the
creek was navigable and subject to the public trust doctrine, there was
no indication that the pollution interfered with the public’s right to fish
or access the waterway for navigation.174 While it is understood that a
broadening “of the public trust doctrine for no other reason than to
protect the environment simply ignores the economic precedent

166

Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422, 434 (Alaska 1998) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Id.
168 Brady v. State, 965 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1998).
169 See, e.g., id.
170 Id. at 17.
171 Evans v. Johnstown, 410 N.Y.S.2d 199, 207 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (holding that we must
disallow any action that interferes “with the public’s right to fish or with the public’s right of
access for navigation”). However, the pollution ultimately resulted in the D.E.C.’s indicating
that recreational use and aquatic life had been adversely impacted. Mohawk/Cayadutta Creek
Watershed, N.Y. DEP’T ENVTL. CONSERVATION (Aug. 14, 2002) https://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/
water_pdf/wimohawkcayadutta.pdf.
172 See infra Section VIII.
173 Evans, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 207.
174 Id. Similarly, legislative approval was required for the construction of a bridge that
would interfere with navigation. Macrum v. Hawkins, 184 N.E. 817 (N.Y. 1933).
167
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established by the original doctrine itself,”175 the public does not want
to engage in recreational activities in polluted water. The court,
nevertheless, ruled that the state’s public trust doctrine did not apply176
and dismissed the plaintiffs’ relevant cause of action. New York State
should have utilized California’s theory, developed just two years
later, that placed an affirmative duty upon the state to “take the public
trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources,
and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible.”177 When the future
life of a body of water was placed in jeopardy due to a diversion of
several small streams that sustained the water level, the California
Supreme Court permitted the invocation of the State’s public trust
doctrine to end such practice.178 The New York Court of Appeals
should have acknowledged that pollution could be detrimental to the
longevity of Cayadutta Creek, and, therefore, should have been a direct
violation of the doctrine. It is unfortunate that the 1964 New York
Times article that addressed the pollution of Cayadutta Creek was not
discussed in the litigation.179 The article specifically noted that the
public no longer swam in the creek, and many could no longer stand
to be near it due to the stench of contamination.180 Courts should
disregard the Evans v. Johnson181 decision and set new precedent that
preserves the res placed under that state’s doctrine. The simple fact
that the Department of Environmental Conservation published a fact
sheet that provides that the Cayadutta Creek has suffered a decrease in
aquatic life and recreational use should render the Evans decision null
and void.182
If a case similar to Evans v. Johnson confronted the courts of
another jurisdiction, such as Louisiana, it is very likely the result would
have been different. In Louisiana, “[t]he natural resources of the state,
including air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic
quality of the environment shall be protected, conserved, and
175 George P. Smith, II & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural
Law: Emanations Within A Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307 (2006).
176 Evans, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 207.
177 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983).
178 Id. at 711.
179
Neil Sheehan, The Creek at Gloversville—A Picturesque, Meandering Sewer, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 1964, https://www.nytimes.com/1964/12/28/the-creek-at-gloversvilleapicturesque-meandering-sewer.html.
180 Id.
181 Evans, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
182 Mohawk/Cayadutta Creek Watershed, supra note 171.
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replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety,
and welfare of the people.”183 The Louisiana First Circuit indicated
that this section of the constitution is the state’s public trust doctrine
and must be respected.184 Accordingly, had the Louisiana courts heard
Evans v. Johnson, they would likely have found a clear violation of the
public trust doctrine because the state would have a duty to preserve
the creek and its general healthfulness.
While no state has clearly stated that its public trust doctrine
applies to pollution in general, many states have extended their
doctrines’ protection to wildlife.185 On February 2, 1976, the Steuart
Transportation Company (hereinafter “Steuart”) inadvertently spilled
a large amount of oil in the Chesapeake Bay, killing approximately
30,000 migratory birds.186 Subsequently, the Commonwealth of
Virginia and the United States filed suit for the loss of migratory
waterfowl.187 Although Steuart argued that neither the federal nor state
government could sue for the loss of waterfowl it did not own, the court
ruled that ownership is irrelevant.188 The court ultimately found in
favor of both plaintiffs, holding that the state and federal government’s
duty to protect and preserve the public’s interest in wildlife resources
was sufficient to bring the claim.189
California went one step further than Virginia when it
statutorily developed a second public trust doctrine. This second
doctrine was based on California’s Fish and Game Code, which states
that “[t]he fish and wildlife resources are held in trust for the people of
the state by and through the department.”190 The state legislature found
that “[f]ish and wildlife are the property of the people and provide a
major contribution to the economy of the state, as well as provide a
significant part of the people’s food supply; therefore, their
conservation is a proper responsibility of the state.”191 This second
doctrine becomes evident in a 1981 California Supreme Court decision
183

LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
La. Seafood Mgmt. Council v. La. Wildlife & Fisheries Comm’n, 719 So. 2d 119, 124
(La. Ct. App. 1998).
185 See generally N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-0103 (McKinney 2018); CAL. FISH &
GAME CODE § 711.7(a) (West 2018).
186
In re Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp 38, 39 (E.D. Va. 1980).
187 Id.
188 Id. at 40.
189 Id.
190 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 711.7(a) (West 2018).
191 Id. § 1600.
184
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that ruled that the “shorezone is a fragile and complex resource.”192
The court further explained that “[i]t provides the environment
necessary for the survival of numerous types of fish . . . , birds . . . ,
and many other species of wildlife and plants.”193 Moreover, in a 2008
decision, California’s Supreme Court announced that wildlife must be
protected.194
California’s wildlife doctrine was vital in 1980, when
California’s State Energy Resources Conservation and Development
Commission created a field of turbines that generated electricity from
the wind.195 Between 1981 and 2005, the generators “killed tens of
thousands of birds, including between 17,000 and 26,000 raptors—
more than a thousand Golden Eagles, thousands of hawks, and
thousands of other raptors.”196 The Center for Biological Diversity,
Inc. filed suit claiming that the state violated its own public trust
doctrine because it failed to protect and serve wildlife.197 Not only did
the court find in the plaintiff’s favor, but the court also held that it is
irrelevant that the public did not own the wildlife.198 It is extremely
important that the court decided that ownership is irrelevant because
of the difficulty in determining ownership. Many wild animals,
especially birds, migrate from state to state and even from country to
country.199 If the government was forced to prove ownership of the
wildlife that is at the center of a public trust doctrine claim, it would
often fail. This could result in extremely minimal or even no public
trust protection of wildlife. Furthermore, ownership is not necessarily
vital in a public trust doctrine claim, as was evident in the New Jersey
Supreme Court case, Raleigh Avenue Beach Association v. Atlantis
Beach Club, Inc., in which the court simply held that the public has a
right to access privately owned lands to reach publicly owned
property.200
192

State v. Superior Court of Placer Cty., 625 P.2d 256, 259 (Cal. 1981).
Id.
194 Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 187 P.3d 888, 926 (Cal.
2008).
195 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 591 (Ct. App.
2008).
196 Id. at 592.
197
Id. at 591.
198 Id. at 598-99.
199 Animal
Migration, LIST THINGS, LIST EVERYTHING (Mar. 4, 2011),
https://listofeverything.wordpress.com/2011/03/04/list-of-animals-that-migrate-animalmigration-list/.
200 Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc. 879 A.2d 112, 129 (N.J. 2005).
193
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While some states may wish to extend public trust protection
to wildlife, states should not use it to protect against pollution in all
circumstances. Pollution in general should not be subject to the public
trust doctrine when a specific polluter cannot be identified because it
is the legislature’s responsibility to institute acceptable levels of
pollution. However, when a polluter can be identified, the doctrine
should be an appropriate vehicle to seek injunctive relief. It is the role
of the federal and state legislatures to determine what an appropriate
level of pollution is, and then the judicial branch can interpret and
enforce any legislation created to sustain those appropriate levels.201
For this reason, it would be inappropriate for any court to permit a
claim against a government pursuant to the public trust doctrine for
failing to keep pollution to a minimal level.202 However, each state
should recognize that pollution—when caused by an identifiable group
rather than society itself—should fall within the protection of the
public trust doctrine when it affects a protected resource. When
society itself is causing pollution, it is the job of the legislature to
decide when, and if, the pollution is excessive, and then authorize
agencies to implement suitable regulations.203 All of this country’s
courts should permit a claim pursuant to the public trust doctrine only
if a specific polluter can be identified, and such pollution directly and
adversely affects the public’s right to use trust property. All other
pollution claims should arise under either federal or state legislation.
VIII. THE APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE CAN
DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD
It is long established in New York that legislative approval is
required when leasing parkland, even for park purposes.204 However,
an interesting turn of events occurred when the New York City
Department of Parks and Recreation (hereinafter “DPR”) allowed the
operation of a restaurant in Union Square Park with certain
conditions.205 The DPR allowed Chef Driven Market, LLC to operate
a restaurant in parkland without legislative approval; however, DPR
201

Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976).
See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text for a discussion on the Air Quality
Control Act.
203 See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
204 Union Sq. Park Cmty. Coal., Inc. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 8 N.E.3d 797,
801 (N.Y. 2014).
205 Id. at 802.
202
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“retained significant control over the daily operations of the restaurant,
including the months and hours of operation, staffing plan, work
schedules and menu prices.”206 Moreover, the restaurant was only
seasonal, was not permitted to retain exclusive right to the premise,
such as to prohibit the general public from using the seating area, and
needed to open its pavilion to the public once per week for community
events.207 Accordingly, the New York Court of Appeals found these
restrictions to be tantamount to a revocable license—not a lease—thus,
legislative approval was not necessary because the provisions created
a restaurant that complied with park purposes.208 New York
municipalities may convey a revocable license to use parkland so long
as the use complies with park purposes, is subject to direction,
regulation and revocation at the will of the municipality.209
Instead of granting a license as New York City did in the Union
Square Park case, the New York State legislature approved the
construction of Shea Stadium on Queens parkland, known as Willets
West, and permitted the parcel’s use for stadium purposes.210 Upon
the demolition of Shea Stadium, the land became a parking lot for the
new stadium.211 This new use was still considered stadium purposes,
as the parking lot was used in conjunction with the new stadium, Citi
Field.212 Just to the east of Willets West, there is a tract of land known
as Willets Point, or more popularly known as the “Valley of Ashes” as
coined by F. Scott Fitzgerald.213 Although the development project
would have included schools, retail centers and housing (including low
income housing), arguably using the land to its highest and best use,
the New York courts still struck the proposal because it included the
development of parkland at Willets West. Not only was one simply a
parking lot for the use of baseball fans, the second lot was a “blighted
and contaminated tract of land,” both of which would benefit greatly
from the planned development.214

206

Id.
Id.
208 Id.
209 See generally Miller v. City of New York, 203 N.E. 478 (N.Y. 1964).
210
Avella v. N.Y.C., 80 N.E.3d 982, 984 (N.Y. 2017).
211 Id. at 992.
212 Id.
213 F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 23 (1925). In re Avella, 80 N.E.3d at 992
(DiFiore, C.J., dissenting).
214 In re Avella, 80 N.E.3d at 992 (DiFiore, C.J., dissenting).
207
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In fact, the New York judicial application of the doctrine takes
such a strong stance on protection of parkland that in 2001, the Court
of Appeals issued a decision that ultimately put the preservation of a
park and its golf course before the health of New York City
residents.215 The Croton Watershed is one of New York City’s three
primary sources of drinking water and supplies between ten and thirty
percent of the City’s requirements.216 After the United States
Environmental Protection Agency demanded that the City filter and
disinfect the water derived from the Croton Watershed, the City
planned to construct a watershed beneath Van Cortlandt Park.217 The
construction would have taken six years, rendered the use of twentyeight acres of parkland unusable until the construction was completed,
and required the demolition of the golf course and driving range that
would have been reconstructed upon completion of the project.218
Nevertheless, the New York Court of Appeals held that because the
construction would have prohibited the public from using twenty-eight
acres of land and the golf facilities, the project required legislative
approval regardless of the fact that the construction would only be
temporary and would ultimately decrease the health risks associated
with consuming New York City’s drinking water.219
Similar to New York’s strong preservation of parkland, Illinois
follows a strict criticism theory when reviewing legislative alienation.
Such an extreme criticism was exercised in Lake Michigan Federation
v. United States Army Corp of Engineers, a 1990 decision that involved
the not-for-profit Loyola University of Chicago (hereinafter “Loyola”)
after it made attempts to expand its campus.220 Loyola was adjacent to
Lake Michigan and sought legislative and municipal approval to
purchase approximately eighteen acres of the lake.221 Loyola intended
to fill the purchased land and build several athletic fields, a track for
running, biking and walking, all of which would remain open to the
public.222 Loyola’s improvement of the land not only would have
benefitted the public’s enjoyment of it, but Loyola was a not-for-profit

215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222

See, e.g., Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. N.Y.C., 750 N.E.2d 1050 (N.Y. 2001).
Id. at 1051.
Id.
Id. at 1051-52.
Id. at 1054-55.
Lake Mich. Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Ill 1990).
Id. at 443.
Id.
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educational facility and had already received the proper governmental
approval.223 Nevertheless, the court found that the grant violated the
public trust doctrine.224 The court reasoned that under the strict
criticism approach, any alienation of protected areas for the benefit of
a private interest violates the doctrine and “any attempt to relinquish
its power over a public resource should be invalidated under the
doctrine.”225 Such a strict approach should not be utilized because
sometimes, as in this case, alienation of protected trust property is
warranted and could provide the public with a substantial benefit.
While Illinois is very protective of trust res, the decision in
Lake Michigan Federation v. United States Army Corps of Engineers
was not in the best interests of the public. As Professor Jay Wexler
correctly stated, we must pay attention to the “connections between
public health and public lands” and parks.226 Studies have suggested
that parks attract people of all backgrounds and the soothing landscape
acts as a catalyst towards increasing mingling and sociability,
ultimately benefiting public mental health and the feeling of
equality.227 Accordingly, Loyola’s proposed development of Lake
Michigan would have benefitted the public by creating new areas
similar to parkland. Moreover, Professor Wexler’s comments support
New York’s strong protection of parkland; however, New York should
consider an alternative to its current classification process. As of now,
simply listing property as parkland on the local municipal’s assessment
roll is conclusive as to its classification. This can cause a piece of
property owned by a municipality to be deemed inalienable, even when
reclassifying it as alienable would increase its usefulness and
enjoyment by the public. For example, a recent Newsday article
indicated that at least over the past decade, Nassau County, New York
purchased over three hundred acres of land that was intended to be
developed into parks.228 However, those plans fell through and most
of the land is overgrown by brush, and some is even fenced off to
prevent the public from entering the land.229 Nevertheless, Nassau
223

Id. at 455-56.
Id.; Merrill, supra note 135, at 269.
225 Lake Mich. Fed’n, 742 F. Supp. at 445.
226
Jay D. Wexler, Parks as Gyms? Recreational Paradigms and Public Health in the
National Parks, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 155, 188 (2004).
227 Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 779 (1986).
228 LaRocco, supra note 17.
229 LaRocco, supra note 17.
224
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County is restricted from alienating the land except for urban renewal
or if it receives legislative approval. The courts should be more active
in determining whether a certain parcel is properly categorized as a
park, thus, deciding whether alienation without legislative approval is
proper. New York may benefit from following Pennsylvania’s
approach that permits the alienation of trust res when it cannot viably
be used for the purposes it was originally dedicated.230 This would
allow a court to rule that parcels, such as those owned by Nassau
County, are not properly classified as parkland. The government
would then be able to sell these parcels to parties that intend to use the
land instead of their being fenced off and not used at all.
IX.

NEW YORK’S DOCTRINE IS NOT AS OVERLY BURDENSOME
AS MANY MAY BELIEVE

It may come as a surprise to many, especially real estate
developers and riparian landowners, that New York’s doctrine is less
restrictive and burdensome than its counterparts in many states in
several ways.231 First, New York has not expanded the federal
navigable-in-fact test to determine whether a particular body of water
is held in trust. Accordingly, New York only preserves waterways that
are navigable in their natural or unimproved condition, and allows for
substantial and permanent commerce.232 Pursuant to the New York
doctrine, “theoretical or potential navigability, or one that is
temporary, precarious and unprofitable is not sufficient.”233 The
waterway “must have practical usefulness to the public as a highway
for transportation.”234 This is only a minor expansion of the federal

230

In re Estate of Ryerss, 987 A.2d 1231, 1236 n.8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009). See also
Borough of Downingtown v. Friends of Kardon Park, 55 A.3d 163, 169 n.9 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2012).
231 Greg Wehner, Judge Dismises [sic] Lawsuit Challenging Picnic Area Beach Driving,
Parking In Southampton Village, 27EAST.COM (Mar. 19, 2018, 4:31 PM),
http://www.27east.com/news/article.cfm/General-Interest-Southampton/550818/JudgeDismises-Lawsuit-Challenging-Picnic-Area-Beach-Driving-Parking-In-SouthamptonVillage (homeowners complaining of the public’s use of the beach). See infra note 240.
232 N.Y. NAV. LAW § 2(5) (McKinney 2018).
233 Id.
234 Id.
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requirement derived from Illinois Central R.R., which requires the
waterway to support vast commerce.235
While New York has only made a modest expansion of its
navigability test, minimally encroaching on the rights of riparian
landowners, other states take a very different approach. For example,
New Hampshire uses a variation of the navigability test that expands
its doctrine to protect any “river or stream [that] is capable in its natural
state of some useful service to the public because of its existence.”236
The New Hampshire Supreme Court further broadened its doctrine by
indicating that the protected waterways are held in trust for public use
for any lawful and useful purpose—a drastic increase in public trust
protection compared to the traditional use for navigation and fishing.237
Even more of a drastic expansion of the doctrine occurred when the
Kentucky Court of Appeals held that any waterway that can, and does,
float logs or rafts shall be protected under the doctrine.238 Such an
expansion increases the number of waterways and waterbeds that are
held in trust, increasing the benefit to the public; however, this causes
the taking of property from the owners of such lands. While this
expansion certainly increases the benefit to the public, it causes a
substantial burden upon property owners that have to turn over
portions of their land to the state.
Another burden that New Yorkers do not face is criminal
penalties for breach of the doctrine. North Dakota codified a law that
charges citizens with a misdemeanor if they, in any manner, obstruct
the free navigation of any navigable watercourse within this state.239
While it is important to protect certain territories from alienation or
privatization, criminalizing such conduct significantly deters
development near public trust protected areas because of fear of
inadvertent breach. Moreover, it also may chill the use of the
waterways in a way that could be viewed as an obstruction of
navigation and, thus, running counter to the purpose of the doctrine.

235 United States v. Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1874). See supra notes 64-66 and
accompanying text for a discussion of how the public trust doctrine can protect a body of water
in certain sections that are navigable.
236 St. Regis Paper Co. v. N.H. Water Res. Bd., 26 A.2d 832, 838 (N.H. 1942).
237 Id.
238 Floyd Cty. v. Allen, 227 S.W. 994, 995 (Ky. Ct. App. 1921).
239 N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-08 (2017).
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While many New York riparian landowners may express
discontent240 with the fact that the public has the right to use land below
the high water mark of their backyards when the body of water is held
in trust,241 it may surprise them that this is common across the country.
In fact, only a very small handful of states recognize title to the mean
low water mark,242 and some of them only acknowledge limited
ownership rights.243 Moreover, a New York riparian landowner seems
to have unfettered discretion to use the foreshore without causing a
violation of the doctrine so long as the public can still access its natural
state; any alteration of the area could result in trespass charges.244 The
Town of Oyster Bay filed suit against a riparian landowner, Tiffany,
after he filled in the foreshore below the high water mark near his home
in Oyster Bay, Long Island.245 The court ultimately held that Tiffany
was liable for trespass246 and responsible for the cost of removing the
fill.247 This issue was addressed more recently in a New York trial
court decision in Arnold’s Inn, Inc. v. Morgan.248 In that case, the
defendant, a private landowner, had placed fill from the high-water line
across the foreshore.249 The court ultimately found that the defendant’s
action was not a violation of the public trust doctrine because the
placement of the fill did not interfere with the plaintiff’s or public’s
right to reasonable, and convenient, access to the water for navigation,
fishing or similar purposes.250 Instead, the court found the defendant
liable for trespass.251 The court essentially ruled that as long as the
public still has access to the resource, there is no violation.252

240

Steven Gaines, Who Owns the Sand? Beach Squabbles in East Hampton, DAILY
INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 30, 2012), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2012/03/who-ownsthe-sand-beach-squabbles-in-east-hampton.html.
241 Sage v. N.Y.C., 47 N.E. 1096 (N.Y. 1897).
242 See McDonald v. Whitehurst, 47 F. 757 (E.D. Va. 1891), aff’d, 52 F. 633 (4th Cir. 1892);
Phillips v. State, 449 A.2d 250 (Del. 1982) (holding that any taking above the low water mark
would be a condemnation); Orange v. Resnick, 109 A. 864, 867 (Conn. 1920); Citizens’ Elec.
Co. v. Susquehanna Boom Co., 113 A. 559, 561 (Pa. 1921).
243 Mitchell v. St. Paul, 31 N.W.2d 46, 50 (Minn. 1948).
244 Tiffany v. Oyster Bay, 136 N.E. 224 (N.Y. 1922).
245 Id.
246 Id. at 226.
247
Id.
248 Arnold’s Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
249 Id. at 544.
250 Id. at 548.
251 Id. at 550.
252 Id.
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Another reason New York’s doctrine is not overly burdensome
is because legislative approval is not required when making a grant for
urban renewal purposes pursuant to the New York General Municipal
Law, Article 15, § 502(3).253 Urban renewal is defined as a plan
created by a municipality which includes, but is not limited to,
“redevelopment, through clearance, replanning, reconstruction,
rehabilitation, and concentrated code enforcement . . . of substandard
and insanitary areas of such municipalities, and for recreational and
other facilities incidental or appurtenant thereto . . . .”254 Further,
clearance, replanning, reconstruction and rehabilitation are defined as
“renewal, redevelopment, conservation, restoration or improvement or
any combination thereof as well as relocation activities and the testing
and reporting of methods and techniques for the arrest, prevention and
elimination of slums and blight.”255 Moreover, the designation of an
area as “substandard and insanitary,” is an administrative task, not a
legislative act that gives municipalities much flexibility in determining
which areas may qualify.256 Accordingly, whenever property is
conveyed by an Urban Renewal Agency,257 for the purpose of
improving such real estate, the transfer will likely be upheld even if the
resulting product is not open for public use. Nevertheless, there is very
limited case law involving public trust doctrine claims and alienation
for urban renewal.258
The difference Article 15 § 503-a(4) makes in terms of
alienating public trust lands is most clear when comparing a grant
made by the Incorporated Village of Valley Stream259 and the
Incorporated Village of Lynbrook.260 A municipal parking lot located
within the Village of Valley Stream was held by the Village for public
use, and therefore, protected by the public trust doctrine.261
Accordingly, when Valley Stream officials attempted to lease the

253

N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 502(3) (McKinney 2018).
Id.
255 Id.
256 Fisher v. Becker, 258 N.E.2d 727, 727 (N.Y.1970).
257 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 502(3) (Agency is simply an “officer, board, commission,
department, or other agency of the municipality” authorized to carry and direct the renewal
project.).
258 See, e.g., Grayson v. Town of Huntington, 554 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270-71 (App. Div. 1990);
Fisher, 258 N.E.2d at 727.
259 10 E. Realty, LLC v. Inc. Vill. of Val. Stream, 793 N.Y.S.2d 122 (App. Div. 2005).
260 Fisher, 258 N.E.2d at 727.
261 10 E. Realty, LLC, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 123.
254
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space to a private entity for private use without securing legislative
approval, the court found this to be a breach of the doctrine and
declared the lease invalid.262 In contrast, the Village of Lynbrook was
permitted to convey its municipal parking lot for the construction of
privately owned retail and office space because the Village determined
the lands were substandard and unsanitary.263 Therefore, the
conveyance was valid as an urban renewal plan.264
This municipal law is very important because New York
expanded its doctrine to provide extremely broad and strict protection
of parkland, yet subjects it to alienation for urban renewal purposes.265
Real property can become designated for public use or a public park
via an “express or implied offer by the owner and, where required, an
express or implied acceptance by the public.”266 Any property
designated as parkland is held in trust for the benefit of the citizens and
any alienation of the property for non-park purposes requires approval
by the legislature that must be “‘plainly conferred’” in advance of such
use.267 In a 1983 decision, the New York Appellate Division, in
Village Green Realty Corporation v. Glen Cove Community
Development Agency, held that parks may also be alienated pursuant
to urban renewal because Article 15 § 503-a(4) does not expressly bar
its application to parkland.268
In Village Green Realty Corporation, a developer acquired
parkland from the City of Glen Cove for the purposes of urban
renewal; it sought and obtained an opinion from the New York State
Comptroller as to the legality of the conveyance.269 The Comptroller’s
decision indicated that the City of Glen Cove had the authority to

262

Id.
Fisher, 258 N.E.2d at 727.
264 Id.
265 Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1054 (N.Y. 2001)
(holding that placing a water treatment plant underneath a park will not interfere with using
the park for park purposes; however, the construction will deprive the public from using the
park for at least five years). Moreover, the requirement that alienated trust res be utilized for
urban renewal is vital as the project would effectively turn blighted real estate into usable land.
266 Angiolillo v. Town of Greenburgh, 735 N.Y.S.2d 66, 73 (App. Div. 2001). See also
Lazore v. Bd. of Trs., 594 N.Y.S.2d 400 (App. Div. 1993).
267 Friends of Van Cortland Park, 750 N.E.2d at 1055 (quoting Ackerman v. Steisel, 104
A.D.2d 940 (1984)). See also Brooklyn Park Comm’rs v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234, 243
(1871).
268 Vill. Green Realty Corp. v. Glen Cove Cmty. Dev. Agency, 466 N.Y.S.2d 26 (App. Div.
1983).
269 Id. at 27.
263
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convey the parkland absent legislative approval pursuant to the
General Municipal Law § 503-a(4).270 This law gives municipalities
the power to, inter alia, “dedicate, sell, convey, lease, grant or
otherwise transfer any of its right, title and interest in any property,
real or personal, to such agency, or grant easements, licenses or
privileges therein to such agency” for the purpose of urban renewal.271
The Comptroller reasoned that municipalities retained the authority to
alienate parkland for purposes of urban renewal because the law did
not expressly limit its application to parkland and instead permitted
alienation of any property.272 The Comptroller’s decision ultimately
influenced the New York State Appellate Division.273 This was the
first instance where parkland was alienated pursuant to this municipal
law.
It is likely that General Municipal Law § 503-a(4), if utilized
properly, could allow the alienation of Willets West for development.
Many New Yorkers disagree with the Court of Appeals’ decision in
Matter of Avella v. City of New York;274 however, their discontent
should be directed to the approach taken by New York City and the
Queens Development Group, LLC. In Avella, the City accepted
Queens Development Group, LLC’s proposal to develop Willets West,
which was expressly classified as parkland, but the state legislature
only granted New York City permission to lease it to the New York
Mets—it is currently used as a parking lot.275 The proposal also
included development of lands adjacent to Willets West, known as
Willets Point, which was not designated as parkland, but is blighted
and in desperate need of development.276 The City did not seek
legislative approval, nor did it attempt to utilize Article 15 § 503-a(4).
When Senator Avella filed suit, he claimed that legislative approval
was not necessary because the area was previously leased to the
270

Id.
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 502(3) (McKinney 2018) (emphasis added).
272 Vill. Green Realty Corp., 466 N.Y.S.2d at 27-28. In contrast, while N.Y. REAL PROP.
TAX LAW § 995 indicates that when a municipal corporation which owns real estate
“determines that the value thereof is insufficient to justify payment of the tax or special
assessment levied thereon, in lieu of payment it may consent to an order directing sale of the
property at public auction . . . to satisfy the claim,” the Appellate Division has held that this
statute is limited only to property not dedicated to public use. In re AJM Capital II, LLC v.
Inc. Vill. of Muttontown, 14 N.Y.S.3d 476, 477-78 (App. Div. 2015).
273 Vill. Green Realty Corp., 466 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
274 In re Avella v. N.Y.C., 80 N.E.3d 982 (N.Y. 2017).
275 Id. at 984.
276 Id.
271
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Mets.277 The court correctly and ultimately ruled that the development
on Willets West required legislative approval, barring Queens
Development Group, LLC from proceeding with development on that
site.278 This decision does not mean that Willets West and Willets
Point cannot be developed; it simply means that the developer can
proceed with the project on Willets Point and must secure legislative
approval to proceed with construction on Willets West. Moreover, the
court stated “that the remediation of Willets Point is a laudable goal,”
and one that has the support of New York’s citizens. 279 Accordingly,
it is likely that the development would be approved with ease should it
be brought before the legislature as should have been done initially.
Overall, New York’s doctrine is not overly burdensome to
riparian landowners and developers as many may believe. For
example, New York’s navigability test requires that a body of water be
able to support substantial and permanent commerce to receive
protection if it is not tidal. Therefore, bodies of water that are nontidal
and not able to support substantial and permanent commerce may be
subject to private ownership and the public can be completely barred
from using them. However, even if a body of water is subject to the
doctrine, unlike in New Jersey, the public has yet to be given any rights
to cross over private property to access the water or the land up to the
high water mark. Also, while New York has a substantial amount of
parkland protected by the doctrine, it can still be alienated for
development as long as the plan can fall under the state’s general
municipal law’s urban renewal section. If the project does not fit
within the urban renewal requirements, a developer can still seek
legislative approval which will likely be granted if the undertaking is
one which the public wants because the legislature is the voice of the
people. Accordingly, New York’s doctrine is actually very proriparian landowner and does not unduly burden real estate developers
from developing land that is trust res.
X.

CONCLUSION

While New York’s public trust doctrine strongly protects
parkland, the courts should begin to exercise judicial discretion over
whether the classification and protection of certain parcels of land as
277
278
279

Id. at 986.
Id. at 991.
In re Avella, 80 N.E.3d at 991.
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parkland are correct. This will give local governments the ability to
alienate property to be used and enjoyed rather than being overgrown
and rendered inaccessible to the public such as the hundreds of acres
of unused land in Nassau County, New York. New York should also
adopt New Jersey’s Matthews factors to expand the public’s limited
access to beaches and areas otherwise preserved and held open to the
public under the doctrine. Last, the doctrine should not be a
mechanism to fight pollution in general; however, it should be utilized
to prevent trust property from being contaminated by identifiable
polluters when such pollution diminishes the public’s enjoyment of
that property. If New York made these changes, it would likely have
a doctrine that is more effective and beneficial to the public, and could
serve as an excellent and workable model for other states.
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